Premier’s Refusal to Countersign Revenue-Sharing Law Sparks Constitutional Debate in Taiwan

Taipei: Premier Cho Jung-tai’s refusal to countersign amendments to a revenue-sharing law passed by the opposition-controlled Legislature has ignited a significant constitutional debate in Taiwan. This unprecedented move has halted the legislation from being promulgated by the president, raising questions about its legality.

According to Focus Taiwan, the legal amendments in question, passed by the Legislature where the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) hold the majority, propose changes to the allocation of tax revenue between the central and local governments. After the amendments were passed in November, the Cabinet requested a reconsideration, suggesting that the changes could not be implemented. When the request was denied on December 5, the Cabinet was expected to countersign the legislation, enabling presidential promulgation by December 15.

The Cabinet’s opposition stems from concerns that the amendments, which would increase subsidies for local governments, could force the central government to exceed its legal borrowing cap of 15 percent by 2026. Although the 2026 budget proposal has yet to be approved by the Legislature, Cabinet spokesperson Michelle Lee argued that implementing such changes at this stage is not feasible. Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) legislative caucus leader Chung Chia-pin emphasized that the refusal to countersign acts as a safeguard against potentially unconstitutional laws, citing the current incapacity of Taiwan’s Constitutional Court to conduct reviews.

The DPP supports the premier’s decision, referencing Article 37 of the ROC Constitution, which requires the premier to countersign laws to demonstrate responsibility. The DPP argues that the premier can refuse if a bill is unconstitutional or difficult to implement, bearing political responsibility as the Legislature can pass a no confidence motion against him. However, the KMT contends this move manipulates the Constitution, citing Article 72, which mandates the president to promulgate statutory laws within 10 days of passage.

In response to the premier’s refusal, the DPP stated that the Legislature could pass a no confidence motion, compelling the premier to resign. According to Article 2 of the Amended Articles of the Constitution, this could lead to the president dissolving the Legislative Yuan, prompting new elections within 60 days. This drastic step has not been taken under Taiwan’s current constitutional framework and would require cooperation from both sides, as the president can only dissolve the Legislature after a no confidence motion is passed.

Complicating the matter is the deadlock in Taiwan’s Constitutional Court, which has been immobilized since January 2025 due to a lack of justices. The DPP accuses the KMT of intentionally paralyzing the court to avoid scrutiny, while the KMT claims the court is biased, as its members were appointed during DPP control.

Historically, no premier has refused to countersign a bill passed by the Legislature. The only similar instance occurred in 1991 when then-Premier Hau Pei-tsun blocked a presidential move to promote a military aide, resulting in constitutional amendments to prevent such situations.

If the budget is not passed by the year’s end, Taiwan’s Budget Act stipulates that spending levels from the current year will be maintained, ensuring government operations continue without disruption.