Taipei: The United States’ recently unveiled “America First Arms Transfer Strategy” presents potential benefits for Taiwan, contingent upon its implementation and Taiwan’s allocation of sufficient funding, according to U.S. defense experts.

According to Focus Taiwan, Mark Montgomery, a retired rear admiral in the U.S. Navy and a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, emphasized that the new foreign military sales (FMS) guidance could be advantageous for Taiwan “if done properly.” This follows U.S. President Donald Trump’s signing of an executive order titled “Establishing an America First Arms Transfer Strategy,” marking a policy shift towards prioritizing U.S. arms sales and transfers to partners with higher defense spending and strategic importance.

The order signifies a departure from the traditional first-come, first-served delivery approach. However, Montgomery cautioned that the order is merely a small part of the necessary reform within the FMS process to address delivery backlog
s that countries like Taiwan are experiencing.

John Dotson, director of the Global Taiwan Institute, pointed out that the order’s ambiguous wording complicates the assessment of its impact on Taiwan. He highlighted two key sections of the order, one suggesting that foreign arms sales will support domestic re-industrialization and expand production capacity within the U.S. defense industrial base. This could imply prioritization of larger-ticket items such as aircraft, missiles, or heavy artillery like HIMARS.

Dotson also considered the potential for collaborative programs between the U.S. and Taiwan, such as developing unmanned aerial vehicles. However, he speculated that the emphasis on “domestic reindustrialization” may lean towards prioritizing big-ticket items, potentially favoring some Middle Eastern customers.

The second critical part of the order, as noted by Dotson, emphasizes prioritizing arms sales to partners investing in their self-defense, possessing critical geography in U.S. plans, or contri
buting to U.S. economic security. This could be interpreted as indirect support for Taiwan, given its strategic location.

Moreover, the emphasis on partners investing in their defense increases pressure on Taiwan’s opposition parties to approve a proposed NT$1.25 trillion (US$39.86 billion) special defense budget for 2026-2033, currently stalled in the opposition-controlled Legislature. Additionally, the Legislature has yet to approve the government’s 2026 general budget proposal, which seeks a 20.1 percent increase in defense funding to NT$949.5 billion, equivalent to 3.32 percent of Taiwan’s GDP, moving closer to the goal of raising defense spending to 5 percent of GDP by 2030.